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ment and product of plaintiff were of precision type and the cleaning-up
process involved the disassembling of intricate machinery, cleaning it, im-
mersing it in oil, and then reassembling it. The cleaning of the product
involved metallurgical knowledge and processes - scarcely work for com-
mon labor."2
What facts are necessary to sustain a jury's award of punitive damages?
The court in deciding Waters v. Novak3 was concerned with that problem.
The plaintiff had purchased a suburban house and lot from -the defendant
The plaintiff was in part induced to make the purchase by the defendant's
false representation that the well for the home provided sufficient water.
The evidence established that defendant knew that the water supply was
inadequate and indicated that such was defendant's reason for selling the
house. At the trial the jury awarded punitive damages and from this an
appeal was taken. Beginning with Drew v. Chrzstopher Constructwn Co.,4
the court of appeals reviewed the earlier cases concerned with the award of
punitive damages. The court concluded that while punitive damages can-
not be allowed because of "legal" malice that they will be allowed where
"actual" malice is present. It quotes with approval, from Green v. Kethley,5
that as to "the nature of the malice in actions of the kind involved in the
instant case the better rule is that such malice must be not simply the
doing of an unlawful or injurious act but as going further and meaning
evil motive, actual malice in the sense of a spirit of mischief or criminal
indifference to civil obligations."' On this basis the evidence was held
to support the jury's award.
EDGAR I. KING
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Annulment, Divorce and Alimony
In January, 1952, the Ohio Supreme Court in Eggleston v. Eggleston'
laid down the broad rule that Section 3105.01 of the Ohio Revised Code
(Ohio General Code Section 11979), authorizing the granting of a di-
vorce where "either party had a husband or wife living at the time of the
marriage from which the divorce is sought," provides an exclusive remedy in
cases involving that situation, and that an annulment cannot be granted.
1113 N.E.2d 401 (Ohio App. 1953)
'Id. at 406.
115 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio App. 1953)
*140 Ohio St. 1, 41 N.E.2d 1018 (1942).
186 F.2d 238 (8th Cir. 1936).
aWaters v. Novak, 115 N.E.2d 420, 425 (Ohio App. 1953).
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In April, 1952, the same general- problem was presented to the Cuya-
hoga County Court of Appeals in Nyhuas -v. Pierce.2 The plaintiff sought
an annulment on the grounds that at the time. of the marriage-between the
plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant was validly married- to another.
The defendanes answer joined in seeking the relief prayed for by--the
plaintiff. Held: an annulment may be granted. The court, in distinguish,
mg the present case from the Eggleston case, reasoned that the plaintiff. .in
the Eggleston case was asking for relief under the divorce statutes and was
dearly entitled thereto. But that under.the facts of the instant case, neither
of the parties -asked for, nor were they entitled to, any relief- that was ex-
clusively within the purview of the divorce statutes. The court-stited.-that
where the facts do not require the use of the divorce statutes to protect the
rights of property or support, they should not be construed as being involved.
Although the result in Nyhuts v. Pierce is sensible, and while it-is:true
that the facts in the two cases are not identical, nevertheless it-might well
be argued that the rule as stated in the Eggleston case is broad enough-to
cover the Nyhus situation.
Basickas v. Bastckass was an action for divorce by the wife upon the
ground that the marriage was fraudulently contracted. The plaintiff wife
is the niece of the defendant husband. Both parties knew of the relation-
ship at the time they signed the application for the marriage license and
therein stated that they were not nearer of kin than second cousins and
that there was no legal inpediment to their marriage. The trial court- dis-
solved the marriage and the husband appealed, maintaining that. the trial
court erred as a matter of law in awarding a judgment of divorce- to the
wife on the ground of fraudulent contract. Held: where one has entered
into a marriage. within the degree of consanguinity prohibited by the law of
Ohio, either party to such marriage may obtain a divorce on the statutory
ground of fraudulent contract. Such marriage is void ab snto. -The relief
afforded by the statute is extended to a fraud perpetrated on the law. The
judgment was affirmed. The court cited the Eggleston' case-and recognized
its doctrine of the supremacy of the divorce statutes.
An attempt at suicide, or at least going through the motions, by one
who is not mentally ill or otherwise incompetent accompanied by prior
and subsequent statements of a desire to commit suicide, or to be dead,
whether such acts and statements were made or done with bona fide intent
or to aggravate the other party to the marriage, constitutes extreme cruelty,
which is ground for divorce."
'156 Ohio St. 422, 103 N.E.2d 395 (1952).
'65 Ohio L. Abs. 73, 114 N.E.2d 75 (App. 1952).
'93 Ohio App. 531, 114 N.E.2d 270 (1953).
' 156 Ohio St. 422, 103 N.E.2d 395 (1952)
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Although it is provided by statute that "on the filing of petition for
divorce or for alimony, the court may and in cases in which there are chil-
dren under fourteen years of age involved shall, cause an investigation to be
made as to the character, family relations, past conduct, earning ability, and
financial worth of the parties to the action," no statute provides for pay-
ment of the expenses of the investigation. In Smith v. SmsthT it was held
that such expenses could not be included in the costs and assessed against
one of the parties since costs are allowable only by authority of statute. Pay-
ment of these expenses may be made, however, upon the warrant of the
county auditor upon the proper certificate of the common pleas court
judge allowing the claim.
Temporary Alimony
A sound position was taken by the court of appeals in Englund v. Eng-
lund,' where it was held that the fact that a husband and wife continue to live
together under the same roof after a petition for divorce has been filed, while
constituting an element to be given careful consideration, should not neces-
sarily and ipso facto require a denial of temporary alimony to the wife, and
where the financial or other circumstances of the parties furnish practical
reasons for such action, temporary alimony may be warranted.
Effect of Divorce Upon Dower
A question of great interest to tilde attorneys was answered to their
satisfaction by the Ohio Supreme Court in Goodman v. Gerstle,' a declara-
tory judgment action brought to determine the dower rights of the plaintiff.
Prior to 1932, the Ohio Code provided that if the successful party survived
his or her divorced spouse, such party was entitled to dower in the realty
of which the deceased was seized during coverture. Since January 1, 1932,
the statutes have provided that upon the granting of a divorce each party
shall be barred of all right of dower in the realty of the other.'0 In the
principal case the plaintiff was granted an absolute divorce from her hus-
band in 1918. In the decree, the court expressly provided that "she was not
by this decree of divorce and alimony barred of her right and interest of
dower in any of the real estate of the defendant at the date of this decree."
The deceased died in 1947 This action was then brought by the plaintiff.
Affirming a judgment for the defendants, the court held the legislation of
'Liedorff v. Liedorff, 113 N.E.2d 127 (Erie Corn. P1. 1953).
OHio REV. CODE S 3105.08 (OHIo GEN. CODE 5 8003-9)
'93 Ohio App. 294, 114 N.E.2d 480 (1952)
'92 Ohio App. 527, 110 N.E.2d 35 (1952).
'158 Ohio St. 353, 109 N.E.2d 489 (1952).
"OHio REv. CODE 5 3105.10 (OHIo GEN. CODE S 8003-11)
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19.32. barring dower .to -be a xealid exercise. of- legislative power and ap-
plicable to all mchoate..dower rights -existing at the tnme the legislation be-
cameeffecuve; The decision also pointed- out that the- divorce court in
1918, -imn making the order to the effect that the -plaintiff -was not by the
decree of. divorce and alimony barred 'of her dower rights in the realty
owned by her husband at that time, " was without jurisdiction to pass
upon or render any decree awarding the plaintiff any right of dower which
was in conflict with legislative enactment creating dower or alimony
rights."1 In other words, inchoate dower is the creature of statute, and
does or does not exist solely by the force of statute.
The theory of the decision would appear to eliminate any claim to dower
in the analagous situation where, prior to 1932 a husband conveys realty
without his wife's joining in the conveyance to release her dower rights;
the wife subsequently, but before 1932, obtains an absolute divorce; and
the husband sometime after January 1, 1932, dies leaving his ex-wife sur-
viving. While the dower statute presently in force' 2 gives the "surviving
spouse" dower in any realty conveyed by a deceased consort during marriage,
it does so only if the surviving spouse has not (1) relinquished, or (2) been
barred from dower in such realty. It would appear that the ex-spouse
would fall within the second provision of the statute and hence would have
no claim to dower in such a situation. It also is difficult to see how the
ex-wife could be regarded as a "surviving spouse," as the term is used
in the dower statute.
Minor Spouse Bound by Separation Agreement
It was held in Burlovwc v. Farmer"' that although the wife was a minor
at the time she-entered into a separation agreement with her husband, now
deceased, wherein it was provided that they both released each other from all
claims of any nature arising out of the marital relationship and that the wife
was not to receive any alimony or support and would not demand any rights
accruing to her by reason of the marital relationship, such separation agree-
ment was valid and biding on the wife and she was not entitled to any por-
tion of her deceased husband's estate, including the part exempt from ad-
ministration and the year's allowance.
The court reasoned, quite correctly it seems, that the wife could not
avoid the agreement on the ground of minority since the statute14 authoriz-
ing separation agreements does not distinguish between married persons
who have attained majority and those who have not. Still another reason
* Goodman v. Gerstle, 158 Ohio St. 353, 360, 109 N.X.2d 489, 493 (1952).
"'Oiio REv. CODE § 2103.02 (OHio GEN. CODE § 10502-1).
115 N.X.2d 411 (Ohio App. 1953).
OHO REv. CODE § 3103.06 (Oino GEN. CoDE § 8002-6).
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